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INTRODUCTION

The Tenth Circuit this term considered a variety of cases
which involved intellectual property. Of particular interest to
franchisers and franchisees is the decision in Redd v. Shell Oil
Co.,' in which the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the
District Court for the District of Utah that Shell's restrictions on
the use of its trademark "Shell" for gasoline constituted an illegal
tying arrangement under the Sherman Act.2 Redd and Value
House v. PhillipsMercantile Co., I another trademark case worthy
of note, are discussed in greater detail below.
In CMI Corp. v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc.4 the Tenth
Circuit upheld an opinion of the District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma on the question of patent validity but remanded the case on the issue of patent infringement.5 Implicit in
the decision was a holding that the district court's factual findings comparing the processes of the parties' method patents were
clearly erroneous.' The district court had given heavy evidentiary
weight to the appellant's advertising materials. Descriptions of
the process in these materials contradicted those presented at
trial; therefore, the district court had held appellant estopped to
deny those prior assertions.7 While the Tenth Circuit agreed that
those representations should be considered, it held that the prior
* Partner, Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado; B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.
** Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
*** Associate, Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1972, Louisiana Tech University; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
**** A.B., 1964, Duke University; M.S.L.S., 1966, University of North Carolina;
J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
523 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1975).
534 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 878.
See id. at 883.
Id. at 876.
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statements did not form "a proper basis for an estoppel,"' and
furthermore that they could not "serve to controvert what is
clearly demonstrated to be the actual fact."'
Two appeals to the Tenth Circuit were related to copyright
and trademark activity but turned on other issues. In United
States v. Blanton" defendants' conviction for criminal infringement of copyrighted sound recordings was upheld after an appeal
based primarily on criminal procedure grounds." In Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner2 legal expenses incurred in asserting a
trademark were held not to be deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses, since their origin was capital in nature. 3
I. Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054 (10th Cir. 1975)
During the past term, an important trademark case arose on
appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Utah. The district court had, by summary judgment, dramatically extended the application of per se antitrust tying theories
from the field of "rent-a-name" franchises to the field of
"distributor" franchises. For only the second time in its history,
the United States Trademark Association filed an amicus curiae
brief. 5 The Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment of the
district court and limited antitrust tying violations strictly to the
prior precedent involving only "rent-a-name" franchises. 6 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 7
The facts were simple. Redd had entered into a sales contract
with Shell as a jobber, or distributor, of "Shell" gasoline manufactured by Shell. Redd was not restricted in distribution of gasoline from other companies or sources. The sales contract specifiId. at 884.
Id. at 883.
" 531 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
531 F.2d at 444.
' 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975).
'+ Id. at 139.
" See 182 U.S.P.Q. 280 (D. Utah 1974).
IS 65 TRADEMARK REP. 511 (1975).
x Redd had relied on Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), for
its assertion that a trademark was a separate product for antitrust tying purposes. The
Chicken Delight situation involved a trademark franchiser whose primary product was its
name. In Redd the product involved was gasoline which was identified to its source of
origin by a trademark. 524 F.2d at 1057.
"7425 U.S. 912 (1976).
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cally restricted Redd to use of the trademark "Shell" only on
gasoline acquired from Shell. Redd, however, purchased gasoline
at a significantly lower cost from another supplier and distributed
that gasoline as "Shell" gasoline. Upon acquiring knowledge of
Redd's substitution activities, Shell demanded that Redd cease
this practice. Redd immediately brought an action in federal district court, alleging that Shell's restrictive provision violated per
se the antitrust laws based upon Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. IS
Shell countersued for trademark infringement.
The Tenth Circuit held that Redd was guilty of trademark
infringement and that Shell's activities did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. This section is based on the trademark
infringement holding. A brief discussion of the history of trademark law, in light of the facts of this particular case, ensues, and
a summary of the Chicken Delight standard and its respective
limits also is presented.
A.

Evolution of Trademark "Value"

The United States Supreme Court in United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co. 01 recognized the role of trademarks in the
United States: "Its function is simply to designate the goods as
the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will
against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the
subject of property except in connection with an existing busi20
ness."
Earlier, the Supreme Court in Menendez v. Holt 2' recognized
that the trademark owner need not be the manufacturer of the
goods on which the trademark is used.
The growth in the United States of the use of trademarks is
unsurpassed in commerce. As the United States Supreme Court
has recognized:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark
is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The

21

448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
248 U.S. 90 (1918).
Id. at 97.
128 U.S. 514, 520 (1888).
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owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every
effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it
appears.2

Unfortunately, in early evolution, the common law of trademarks was adjudicated on a state-by-state basis, leading to nonuniformity of protection for trademark owners. Trademark rights
were awarded only on a territory of use basis.23 This Balkanization
of trademark common law was substantially eliminated by the
passage of the Federal Lanham Act in 1946.24 Section 45 of that
Act incorporated, however, the common law concept of a trademark: "The term trade-mark includes any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination tlereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others. 2' 5 With the
passage of the Lanham Act, a trademark owner upon using a
mark in interstate commerce could for the first time register the
mark with the federal government and be accorded nationwide
protective rights in his mark-even in those territories not yet
entered.
One provision of the Lanham Act provided the impetus for
the growth of a new business tool-that of the franchise system.
Section 5 of the Lanham Act specifically provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may
be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to
the benefit of the registrant or applicant for registration, and such
use shall not affect the validity of such mark or its registration,
provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive the
public."

The phenomenal growth of franchise operations in American
business has been well documented.27 A significant portion of
2
these businesses involve trademark licensing franchise systems. 1
" Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
2 See 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26.1 (1973).
2 See id. § 26.13.
- 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).

- Id. § 1055.
27 D. THOMPSON,

FRANCHISE OPERATION AND ANTITRUST

26-40 (1971).

Pelton, Fisher, & Prestia, Tying and Trademark Franchising:A Look at the Developing Case Law, 3 AM. PAT. L.A.J. 254 (1976).
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Such operations provide predictable quality for consumers, security and guidance for franchisees, and may well provide for lower
failure rates than is common in nonfranchised businesses.29 Yet
attempts by franchisers to control various aspects of franchisee
activity have been criticized as being anticompetitive.'
B.

Antitrust Tying Restrictions on Franchise Trademark Use

In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.31 the Ninth Circuit held
that the trademark owner (franchiser) had violated the antitrust
laws by requiring its franchisees to purchase certain supplies only
from the franchiser. The franchiser made no use of the mark and
merely licensed other people to use it. Such use of a trademark
has been termed a "rent-a-name" use. 32 In this case the franchise
operated as "Chicken Delight" and was required to buy mixes,
paper plates, napkins, cooking utensils, and the like from the
franchiser at significantly higher prices than such commodities
were priced from other sources. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The burgeoning business of franchising has made trade-mark licensing a widespread'commercial practice and has resulted in the development of a new rationale for trade-marks as representations of
product quality. This is particularly true in the case of a franchise
system set up not to distribute the trade-marked goods of the franchisor, but, as here, to conduct a certain business under a common
trade-mark or trade name. Under such a type of franchise, the trademark simply reflects the goodwill and quality standards of the enterprise which it identifies. As long as the system of operation of the
franchisees lives up to those quality standards and remains as represented by the mark so that the lublic is not misled, neither the
protection afforded the trade-mark by law nor the value of the trademark to the licensee depends upon the source of the components.3

The purpose of this article is not to challenge the soundness
of the Chicken Delight case; however, its logic is specious. The
Ninth Circuit concluded: "Just as the patent or copyright forecloses competitors from offering the distinctive product on the
market, so the registered trade-mark presents a legal barrier
" D. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 33-34.

10Id. at 55-123.
31 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).

"2McCarthy, Trademark Franchisingand Antitrust: The Trouble with Tie-ins, 58
L. REV. 1085, 1086 (1970).

CALIF.
"

448 F.2d at 48-49 (footnotes omitted).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 54

against competition. ' 34 Yet a trademark differs markedly from a
patent or a copyright. Patents and copyrights are constitutionally
protected monopolies-no other person or company can manufacture a patented or copyrighted article without infringement
thereof.35 Patents and copyrights present true barriers to competition. However, a trademark presents no such barrier and would,
rather, seem to enhance competition. The use of a trademark does
not prevent others from offering the same product but merely
prevents others from using a confusingly similar trademark to
offer their products. The value to the public, and hence the enhancement of competition, is the public's ability to identify
between the same competing products.
The soundness of the Chicken Delight holding notwithstanding, the facts of the Shell case simply did not fall within the
teachings of Chicken Delight. In fact, Chicken Delight specifically limited itself to the case of a franchise system "set up not
to distribute the trademarked goods. ' 3 Chicken Delight, Inc. neither raised nor sold chickens but merely franchised a method of
doing business, which it tied to purchases of common items such
as paper products. The Chicken Delight decision specifically limited its findings of a tie-in to those situations "where the37tied
product is not itself the product represented by the mark.
J. Thomas McCarthy, a recognized expert in the law of
trademarks, has distinguished between "rent-a-name" and
"distributing" franchises as follows: "In those franchises where
the franchisor manufactures nothing itself, but really is in the
business of selling a franchise package consisting primarily of the
trademark license, it appears correct to characterize the trademark as a tying item and designated items as tied-in."38 Professor
McCarthy defines "distributing franchises" as having as their
"primary purpose. . . to provide the franchisor with a system for
39
marketing his wares, either at the wholesale or retail level.
3'Id. at 50.
Contra, Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 513 (1964) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting
in part). Judge Lumbard felt the economic power generated by a trademark was indistinguishable from that generated by a copyright or patent. His analysis is commented on in
Pelton, Fisher, & Prestia, supra note 28, at 262.
3' 448 F.2d at 48.
Id. at 52.
McCarthy, supra note 32, at 1109.
Id. at 1089.

1977

PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS

With regard to these types of distributing franchises, he states:
"The franchisee who is primarily a conduit through which products made by the franchisor flow to consumers is in a somewhat
different position. He can legitimately be required to deal exclusively in his franchisor's line of products." 0 Perhaps on a prophetic note concerning the Redd case, McCarthy continues:
"Similarly, a gasoline refiner might properly require its own
brand of gas to be pumped from leased pumps and tanks bearing
its trademark, but cannot require a dealer to sell only a designated brand of tires, batteries, and accessories without violating
the prohibition against tying."'"
If the Tenth Circuit had upheld the district court's summary
judgment that Shell's acts constituted a per se tying relationship,
then the entire evolution of trademark law would have been ignored. The amicus curiae brief of the United States Trademark
Association stated:
[T]he decision below will have an adverse impact on those systems
of distribution in which manufacturers sell products bearing their
trademarks through independent distributors. Many products are
thus distributed to retailers or to the public. Shell, for example,
distributes its gasoline and other petroleum products to its dealers
through jobbers such as Redd.
If Shell could be required to furnish its jobbers with standards
and specifications so that they can sell non-Shell gasoline under the
SHELL trademark, then other manufacturers would be obligated to
do likewise with the distributors of their branded merchandise. As
a result a distributor of branded merchandise, such as appliances,
automobiles, etc., would be free to sell under the brand name or
trademark products which were neither made nor selected by the
trademark owner. The trademark would then no longer identify
source but only quality, and any product which the user believes to
meet the quality could be sold thereunder. The resultant system
would be the functional equivalent of having no trademarks at all."2

Confusion and lack of business certainty result from a situation
in which distributors or even retailers sell, for example, "Ford"
cars not manufactured by Ford or "IBM" typewriters not made
by IBM. Fixing responsibility for repairs would be chaotic.
Id. at 1118.

Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted).
1265 TRADEMARK REP. 511, 523 (1975) (footnote omitted). Contra,A Review of Recent
Tenth Circuit Decisions, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 227, 239-41.
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The Tenth Circuit Holding In Redd Is Eminently Correct

The Tenth Circuit opinion in Redd carefully distinguished
between Redd's position as a jobber ("not doing business as Shell
Oil Company") 43 and that of a franchisee. Emphasizing that
trademark use in this case was permissive, the court concluded
that in such circumstances the trademark could not be held to be
a separate product for purposes of antitrust law.44 The court singled out the following facts: (1) The gasoline was sold as a trademarked product; (2) no one else in the market sold the Shell
trademark; and (3) Shell did not sell the trademark separately. 4'
For the court to extend the rule of the Chicken Delight situation
to such a "typical sale of a trademark product"46 would have been
unwarranted.
Conclusion

D.

Had the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court, then the
Tenth Circuit would have condoned and approved Redd's acts of
unfair competition. Redd had sought to palm off cheaper gasoline
as gasoline coming from Shell; yet Redd was not paying Shell for
the privilege of using the "Shell" mark as is the situation in the
"rent-a-name" franchises. Redd was simply attempting to force
Shell, at virtually no profit to Shell, to maintain quality control
standards over any gasoline sold by Redd.
In truth, Redd had chosen to use an identical trademark,
"Shell," on an identical product, gasoline, in direct competition
with Shell. This is per se trademark infringement-per se unfair
competition. It flies in the face of our common law heritage and
the whole philosophy of the Lanham Act.
Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424 (10th
Cir. 1975)
In Value House the Tenth Circuit restated the relationship
between trademarks registered under the Lanham Act47 and alII.

4 524 F.2d at 1056.
U Id. at 1057.
4Id.
," Id.
47

15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1127 (1970).
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leged infringing marks which were in use prior to that registration."
Plaintiff began using the name "The Value House" in Maine
in 1961 and was granted federal registration for that tradename
in October of 1969. Without knowledge of the plaintiff's use of the
name, defendant adopted on or about May 1, 1968, the name
"Value House" in connection with its retail business in New Mexico and registered the mark under the New Mexico Trademark
Act49 on August 5, 1968.50
Plaintiff began to expand outside of Maine in 1969 and now
has business locations in Maine and six other eastern states.5'
After discovering defendant's use of a nearly identical name in a
similar business, plaintiff brought suit in federal district court for
trademark infringement, claiming under the Lanham Act a right
to exclusive use of the name throughout the United States. The
court dismissed plaintiff's complaint and granted defendant's
counterclaim by issuing an injunction restraining plaintiff from
using the name in New Mexico, western Texas, and southern
Colorado.5" The Tenth Circuit upheld both the ruling on infringe3
ment and the injunctive relief.1
The court of appeals rejected each of the plaintiff's arguments after holding there was no error in the findings of fact of
the trial court.54 The Tenth Circuit held that, although plaintiff
had used the tradename first, the defendant did not have knowledge of that prior use.55 Thus, since defendant's use preceded
plaintiff's registration, the constructive notice provision in section 22 of the Lanham Act could not apply.5
The court also concluded that, although the Lanham Act
provides for registration with constructive notice and affords nationwide protection, the remedies section of the statute limits a
" For a discussion of this limited area defense, see 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 23, §
26.18 (1973).
,' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-4-6 to -12 (1953).
523 F.2d at 427.
51 Id.

5' Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

426.
430-32.
426-27.
428.
429 (applying 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970)).
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defendant's liability to instances in which the defendant's use is
intended to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.57 Since there
had been no finding of actual confusion or even of any customers
in common, the Tenth Circuit held plaintiff had no basis for a
remedy.5 8 Defendant had also innocently adopted the use of the
mark prior to plaintiff's registration and was, therefore, entitled
to a prior use defense.5 9
The court rejected the plaintiff's common law infringement
claim on the grounds that the parties had established rights to
their widely separated markets. 0 In addition the preservation of
defendant's geographical market against any future expansion by
plaintiff was upheld."' Thus, under Value House, the owner of a
registered trademark may be permanently prevented from using
the name in the geographic area of an innocent user. 2
Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970).
523 F.2d at 429.
" Id. at 430. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) requires that such use must precede registration.
The court, therefore, also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the date of filing should
be the determining date. 523 F.2d at 430. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) provides that concurrent
registration may be granted only if prior use occurs before the filing date. Plaintiff argued
that the disparity between the operative dates in the two sections would produce the
anomalous result of an innocent user being able to preserve concurrent use though not
eligible for concurrent registration. The court limited its analysis to the plain meaning of
the statute. The two sections, however, are reconcilable. The key date for analysis of
defenses is the date of registration, which cuts off the prior use defense. But in a concurrent use proceeding neither party yet owns a registration. Some prior date would, therefore, logically be required.
0 523 F.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 432.
62 Id. Only after an abandonment by defendant or "other changed circumstances"
'

might the decree be reexamined. Id.

